Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” As India prepares to use force against Pakistan, it is important to understand to the extent it can, the calculus of the adversary — General Asim Munir.
The civilians in Pakistan have long given up trying to control national security policy, especially towards India. The present government, led by Shehbaz Sharif is probably one the weakest in the history of Pakistan, and does not make even a pretence of being in charge. The key to India’s success in this round of confrontation with Pakistan lies in understanding General Munir’s decision to order the Pahalgam provocation.
That the General has gambled big is not in doubt. General Munir confronts multiple challenges at home — the continuing standoff at home and abroad among the diaspora with the most popular political figure in Imran Khan. Story continues below this ad Pakistan’s relations with Taliban-led Afghanistan are at a historic low.
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is waging a war against the Pakistani state. Meanwhile, the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and PoK are restive. The much-hyped turnaround moves Pakistan’s economy from years of no growth to a period of low growth of about 2.7 per cent this year.
Munir has not been able to deliver on significant reforms to overcome the structural constraints on the economy. Pakistan’s international standing has steadily diminished. It is remarkable that Munir chose to open up Pakistan’s only front that has been relatively stable, if at a low equilibrium — the border with India.
Munir’s gamble may have a logic of its own. In reviving the confrontation with India, Munir has bet that there would be the inevitable rallying round the army in Pakistan. In invoking the two-nation theory and by making the Pahalgam attack a deliberate one against Hindus, he would shore up his position at home.
He might also have hoped that his actions would trigger internal communal violence in India and thereby weaken it. Part of Munir’s calculus is that by raising the prospect of a nuclear escalation, he could mobilise familiar international intervention, prevent India from mounting a full-fledged military campaign, and mount pressure on India to make concessions on Kashmir and reopen the long-stalled bilateral dialogue. Story continues below this ad India’s principal task lies in defeating Munir’s political calculus.
In responding to the terror attack, Delhi must ensure that it does nothing to weaken the internal unity of India. Defeating Pakistan’s attempt to provoke communal conflict is critical for India’s conduct of war and the broader ideological argument with Munir’s “two-nation” theory. India’s imperative to preserve a united domestic front is complemented by the importance of getting the international community to remain neutral if not support Delhi’s military campaign against Pakistan.
Shaping this narrative on India’s battle against Pakistan-based terror groups is critical given the past temptations of major powers, especially the US, to intervene, especially on Kashmir.
